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Abstract: As the share of supplementary health insurance (SI) in health care
finance is likely to grow, SI may become an increasingly attractive tool for risk-
selection in basic health insurance (BI). In this paper, we develop a conceptual
framework to assess the probability that insurers will use SI for favourable risk-
selection in BI. We apply our framework to five countries in which risk-selection
via SI is feasible: Belgium, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.
For each country, we review the available evidence of SI being used as selection
device. We find that the probability that SI is and will be used for risk-selection
substantially varies across countries. Finally, we discuss several strategies for
policy makers to reduce the chance that SI will be used for risk-selection in BI
markets.
Introduction
In most OECD countries, policy-makers consider supplementary health insur-
ance (SI) as one of the primary instruments to limit the statutory financing of
health care. A greater reliance on SI may reduce access to health care, since SI
premiums may be risk-rated and health insurers may not be willing to accept
all applicants. In addition, the expansion of SI may also reduce access to basic
health services, since it may increase the opportunities for risk-selection in basic
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health insurance (BI) markets (van de Ven et al., 2003). For unfavourable risk
groups, risk-selection may imply less choice because of limited switching oppor-
tunities and higher premiums due to lower cross-subsidies from favourable risk
groups.
In this article, we examine the conditions where SI is likely to be used as a tool
for risk-selection in BI markets. In particular, we develop a conceptual frame-
work that identifies the preconditions for the use of SI as a tool for risk-selection
in BI markets, and the determinants of the probability that SI will be used for this
purpose. Then, we investigate to what extent risk-selection via SI is likely to occur
in five countries where the preconditions are met: Belgium, Germany, Israel, the
Netherlands, and Switzerland. For each of these countries, we review the avail-
able evidence on the use of SI as a risk-selection device and we assess whether SI
is likely to be used as a tool for risk-selection. Finally, we discuss the main policy
implications of our findings.
Definitions
In the literature, a great variety of definitions is used to describe health insurance
arrangements in different countries (Colombo and Tapay, 2004). Here, we refer
to a classification of different health insurance arrangements based on two essen-
tial dimensions: (1) whether the services covered are basic or supplementary; and
(2) whether the coverage is mandatory or voluntary (Paolucci et al., 2006). We
use the term basic health insurance (BI) for schemes that provide mandatory
(MBI) or voluntary (VBI) coverage for health care services for which the govern-
ment enforces cross-subsidies between different risk or income groups in order to
guarantee universal financial access. By contrast, we use the term supplementary
health insurance (SI) to refer to schemes that provide mandatory (MSI) or volun-
tary (VSI) coverage for services that are not classified as basic. Since voluntary
basic health insurance (VBI) is not the subject of our analysis, we use the abbre-
viation BI to denote MBI. In countries without MSI we simply use SI to denote
VSI (Figure 1).
Conceptual framework
In this section, we develop a conceptual framework to assess the probability
that SI is or will be used for risk-selection in BI. First, we identify two necessary
preconditions and then the crucial determinants for the use of SI as a selection
device in BI.
Preconditions for risk-selection via SI
The first precondition is that insurers have to have incentives to perform risk-
selection in BI. This implies that health insurers must bear financial risk for
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the provision of BI, and some risk types must be more attractive than others.
Traditionally, BI was provided by non-competing administrative carriers that
were fully compensated for the medical costs of their enrollees (Cutler, 2002).
However, during the 1990s these BI carriers in several countries were exposed
to competition and financial risk. In order to preserve universal financial access,
these changes were typically accompanied by premium rate restrictions, open
enrolment, and risk-adjusted compensation payments. As far as the risk-adjusted
compensation payments are not sufficient to compensate for predictable losses on
high-risk individuals, health insurers in these countries face incentives to select
risks (van de Ven et al., 2003). The second precondition for the use of SI as a
selection device in BI is the presence of a link between the purchasing decisions
for the two types of insurance. This link must exist in order for health insurers
to be able to use SI to influence the consumers’ decision to buy BI. For instance,
if consumers are legally obliged – or have a strong preference – to obtain SI from
the same carrier that provides BI, selective underwriting by insurers of applicants
for SI may undermine open enrolment requirements in BI.
Determinants of risk-selection via SI
If both preconditions are present, the probability that SI will be used for risk-
selection in BI critically depends on the strength of the incentives for risk-selection
in BI and the strength of the links between SI and BI. We distinguish the follow-
ing determinants of the strength of the incentives for risk-selection in BI. The first
crucial determinant is the quality of the risk-equalization scheme. The more accur-
ately insurers are compensated for each risk type, the weaker the incentives for
Figure 1. Defining health insurance schemes
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risk-selection are. A second determinant is the level of financial risk for the health
insurer. The more the insurer is at risk for the financial results of selling BI, the
stronger the incentives for risk-selection. A third determining factor for the incent-
ives faced by insurers is the level of price competition. Strong price competi-
tion will force insurers to exploit the available opportunities for risk-selection.
By contrast, weak competition leaves room for cross-subsidization, which may
reduce incentives for risk-selection, particularly if BI is carried out by non-profit
insurers pursuing social goals (Douven and Schut, 2006).
Next, we discern the following determinants of the strength of the links bet-
ween SI and BI. First, the strength depends on the type of link. In practice, three
types can be observed: (1) regulatory or formal links, (2) insurer-established links
or tying provisions, and (3) consumer-preferred links.
The strongest link is constituted by a legal requirement that SI and BI have to
be sold as a joint product by the same health insurer. Next, insurers may be able
to enforce joint purchase by means of tie-in sale provisions in SI policies. For
instance, SI contracts may include provisions that the contract will be termi-
nated or a surcharge will be required if the subscriber switches to another BI
carrier. Since these tie-in provisions are not legally required, they are likely to
constitute a weaker link than a formally enforced one. If the government forbids
tie-in provisions or even requires that BI and SI must be sold by different legal
entities, insurers may still be able to establish a link between the two. For ins-
tance, insurers could establish such a link by joining the same holding company
and using the same brand name for SI and BI products. Finally, even in the
absence of any formally or insurer-established link, consumers may have strong
preferences for a joint purchase of SI and BI. One-stop shopping may be attract-
ive because it lowers search and transaction costs and because it may facilitate
the coordination of basic and supplementary benefits.
A second determinant of the strength of the link between SI and BI is the
extent to which health insurers are free to set the terms of the contract, the
enrolment rules, and the types of benefits covered by SI. Health insurers can
effectively use SI for risk-selection in BI by means of selective underwriting,
by premium discounts and by benefits design targeted at favourable risk groups
(with respect to BI). Selective underwriting can be based on health history ques-
tionnaires to SI applicants. By including questions that are particularly relevant
to assess the applicant’s risk for BI, insurers can subsequently decide to deny SI
coverage or calculate a high surcharge to compensate for the expected loss on
BI. If allowed, insurers may also decide not to renew the SI contract of enrollees
who are unfavourable risks in BI (selective disenrolment).
The design of specific SI-packages is another strategy that insurers may adopt
to differentiate between low risks and high risks (e.g. early cancer diagnosis is
more likely to be demanded by healthy individuals, whereas cancer therapy by
sick people). In the same way, insurers may advertise SI to certain (profitable)
risk categories, e.g. by using specific distribution channels (internet, fitness clubs
176 F R A N C E S C O P A O L U C C I E T A L .
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744133107004124
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 14:40:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
etc.), offering high rebates for deductibles, informing unprofitable enrolees about
their right to change insurer and providing bonuses to agents who are successful
in getting rid of the most expensive cases by shunting them off to competitors.
Insurers may also attract favourable risks by offering SI premiums below
actuarially fair levels. By using health history questionnaires, insurers can deter-
mine which applicants are likely to be profitable in BI and they may use these
expected profits to offer these applicants a premium discount. Cross-subsidizing
SI contracts by profits on BI contracts may be more attractive than lowering the
community-rated BI premium. This is particularly the case for new entrants
who may be able to use SI for attracting only favourable risks and therefore do
not have to recover any losses in the BI market (Kifman, 2005).
Finally, the strength of the link between SI and BI is also determined by the
importance of SI for consumers. If SI comprises only a small fraction of indivi-
duals’ health care expenses or if only a small proportion of the population pur-
chases SI, then the link between both types of insurance is likely to be weak.
Hence, both the share of SI in health care financing and the share of the popu-
lation covered by SI are likely to be positively related to the probability that SI
will be used for risk-selection in BI.
Supplementary health insurance as a tool for risk-selection in
mandatory basic health insurance markets in five countries
In this section, we investigate to what extent SI is likely to be used as a tool for
risk-selection in the BI market in five countries: Belgium, Germany, Israel, the
Netherlands, and Switzerland. These countries were selected because each coun-
try fulfils the preconditions for risk-selection via SI: insurers face incentives for
risk-selection in BI and there are links between the decisions to purchase BI and
SI. For each of the five countries we assess whether SI is likely to be used as a
tool for risk-selection in BI by examining to what extent the determinants of
the conceptual framework are relevant in these countries. In addition, we review
the available evidence of the actual use of SI as a risk-selection device. Table 1
summarizes the main features of SI in each of the five countries.
Belgium
Main features of SI
In Belgium, three types of SI can be distinguished, two of which can be used as
a tool for risk-selection in the BI market. First, almost all local BI providers offer
mandatory supplementary coverage (MSI). It is stipulated in the statutes of these
local insurers that SI is mandatory for all their members. Moreover, according to
the law all insured are legally obliged to enroll with the same local insurer for
both BI and MSI. Second, BI providers offer voluntary supplementary coverage
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(VSI) on top of BI and MSI (primarily extra hospital services). Again, insured
who want to buy VSI are obliged to enroll with the same BI/MSI provider.
From 1994 until 2002, SI expenditures as a share of BI expenditures remained
constant at 2% (Table 1), indicating that SI and BI expenditures grew at the same
rate. Currently, MSI covers costs related mainly to hospitalization, health care
abroad, transportation of the sick, logopaedics, orthodontics, alternative medi-
cine, and home care. VSI expands the coverage of hospital costs. The benefits
package is regulated by the law, which obliges every BI provider to offer at least
one item in the MSI. In reality, all insurers offer dozens of additional benefits
ranging from health promotion to all kinds of advantages such as family allowan-
ces in case of childbirth, cheap holidays for children and pre-marriage savings.
The level of concentration of the SI market is low, the market share of the
four largest insurers being only about 19.4%. Premium rate restrictions (e.g.
community-rated premiums) are absent in both SI markets. In case of financial
problems, the Control Office can oblige insurers to take some measures. There
is no formal open enrolment in the MSI market. Nevertheless, insurers do not
deny access in practice. SI providers are not allowed to exclude new enrollees
because of their age or health status. SI contracts can be terminated yearly, sub-
ject to three months’ notice by the insured.
Incentives for risk-selection
The risk-equalization scheme in Belgium is based on demographic and socio-
economic information. There are also some morbidity-related risk-adjusters, but
they are not based on diagnostic information, meaning that BI providers can
easily identify highly profitable risk groups (Schokkaert and Van de Voorde,
2003). Despite the rather poor risk-equalization scheme, incentives for risk-
selection are substantially mitigated by the limited financial risk for BI providers
(7.5% of gains and losses). In addition, the out-of-pocket BI premium is almost
negligible, so price competition is hardly feasible. Finally, in absence of competi-
tion, BI carriers have no strong drive to select risks, since they are non-profit enti-
ties pursuing social goals. Due to the limited financial risk and the absence of
price competition, BI providers have relatively weak incentives for risk-selection.
Usefulness of SI as selection device
The law stipulates that the insured must obtain BI and MSI from different entities
of the same insurer. These entities must be financially independent and cannot
cross-subsidize each other. In practice, however, it is difficult to attribute market-
ing and administrative costs to the different entities, since the same insurer offers
SI and BI. Typically, BI and SI are marketed as joint products. For insurers, the
strong formal links make SI a potentially important tool to attract customers.
For Belgian insurers the most straightforward strategies to select favourable
risks in SI markets are product and premium differentiation. Premiums are
differentiated according to risk categories, mainly age, family composition,
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and employee/self-employed status. The benefits package is regulated but the
freedom to differentiate is sufficiently large to attract specific risk groups. Under
the Belgian law, comparative or misleading advertising is forbidden. In addi-
tion, the law forbids that benefits are granted with the purpose of inciting
switching. In practice, these regulatory restrictions on selective marketing and
benefits design are not very effective (see below).
Finally, selective underwriting, particularly in the forms of waiting times and
exclusion of pre-existing medical conditions, is allowed and used in the VSI
market. Despite the fact that SI offers insurers a potentially effective tool for
risk-selection, the usefulness of SI for this purpose is restricted due to the limited
importance of SI in health care financing. This together with the weak incent-
ives for risk-selection makes it unlikely that SI is a frequently used tool for
risk-selection in BI.
Evidence of risk-selection via SI
Nevertheless, there are indications that SI is increasingly used for favourable
risk-selection. Although evidence is largely anecdotal, selective advertising has
increased during recent years. Certain insurers selectively promote new insur-
ance products related to sports (such as a reduction of registration fee for the
sports club or discounts for children participating in a sports camp). In the lead-
ing Belgian newspaper De Standaard (Tegenbos, 2005), CEOs of three major
insurers’ associations (with a combined market share of 77%) accused two
other insurers’ associations (with a combined market share of 21%) of attract-
ing young and healthy enrollees by offering them advantageous SI contracts.
Since 2000, the number of items included in the SI has steadily increased, with
substantial differences between the different funds. According to the three
CEOs, this risk-selection undermines access, and they appealed to the govern-
ment to make these selection activities impossible by imposing a uniform stan-
dardized benefits package and by prohibiting any marketing activities involving
a comparison of SI contracts. Evidence from a survey among VSI members of
the Christian insurers showed that specific benefits are particularly attractive
to specific risk groups (Christian Mutualities, 2003). Not only enrolment in VSI
substantially differed between various age and socio-economic groups, but an
analysis of the survey data also revealed a positive relation between charac-
teristics such as education, income, and marital status and the probability of
having hospital insurance.
Germany
Main features of SI
Two types of supplementary insurance can be distinguished in Germany: MSI
and VSI.
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MSI is exclusively offered by (most) BI providers. On top of the standardized
mandatory basic benefits package (MBI), German insurers are allowed to offer
extra benefits, up to a maximum of 5% of BI expenditures (Buchner and Wasem,
2003). MSI benefits include services such as spa treatments and hospice treat-
ment. Supplementary benefits are determined in the by-laws of the individual
insurer and are mandatory for all subscribers of that insurer (no opting-out).
Open enrolment for BI also applies to MSI. Moreover, insurers must charge a
single contribution rate for both basic and supplementary benefits. However, in
contrast to BI, expenses for MSI are not included in the risk-equalization scheme.
German citizens can also buy supplementary insurance from competing for-
profit carriers on a voluntary basis (Wasem et al., 2004). VSI mainly covers costs
regarding upgraded hospital accommodation, dental care, alternative medicine,
glasses, and co-payments. The VSI market is unregulated: no premium rate
restrictions (e.g. community-rated premiums), no open enrolment requirements,
and no standardized benefits. VSI providers are allowed to calculate risk-rated
premiums and to exclude pre-existing conditions from coverage. Usually, applic-
ants 55 years or older receive no contract at all. BI carriers are not allowed to
offer VSI. VSI comprises only 2% of BI expenditures and 11% of the German
population. The market share of the four largest VSI insurers is about 45%
(Table 1).
Incentives for risk-selection
The risk-equalization scheme in Germany does not effectively neutralize incen-
tives for risk-selection (Buchner and Wasem, 2003). This and the high level of
financial risk for health insurers, accountable for 97% of gains and losses, cre-
ate strong incentives for risk-selection. In addition, the high level of competition
due to the presence of about 250 BI carriers, and the absence of entry barriers
further reinforce the incentives for risk-selection. For instance, new BI carriers
(e.g. Betriebskrankenkassen, BKKs) grew rapidly after entering the market
because they were successful in attracting favourable risks by offering low
contribution rates (Tamm et al., 2006).
Usefulness of SI as a selection device
BI and MSI are tightly linked, since they are offered and marketed as joint
products by a single provider at a single price. If subscribers want to opt out,
they can only switch to another BI provider that offers a different package of
supplementary benefits. The strong link between MSI and BI makes MSI a
potentially useful tool to attract favourable risks. Despite this, the usefulness
of MSI for risk-selection in BI is restricted by the open enrolment requirement,
the absence of a separate premium, and the limited scope of the supplementary
benefits that can be included. In fact, the only way that MSI can be used for
risk-selection is by the design of the benefits package.
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Until 2004, VSI and BI were completely separated by law. Then, the govern-
ment decided to allow BI providers to act as agents for VSI providers. Most BI
providers now cooperate with one VSI provider and offer premium discounts to
their subscribers. Moreover, as part of this cooperation, some VSI providers
waive their right to reject applicants. However, none of them has waived its
right to calculate risk-related premiums. If subscribers switch to another BI
provider, in most cases they lose their VSI discount. Opportunities for BI provi-
ders to use this link as a tool for risk-selection are rather limited, since BI and
VSI providers are also not allowed to cross-subsidize each other and must be
financially independent from each other.
Evidence of risk-selection via SI
Nevertheless, there is some evidence that BI carriers use the composition of MSI
benefits to attract low risks. A comparison of supplementary benefits for the
three main types of BI providers shows substantial differences (Nuscheler and
Knaus, 2005). Whereas most of the traditional regional BI carriers (AOKs) offer
benefits that are attractive to the high risks – such as chiro therapy (91%), can-
cer therapy (64%), homeopathic medicine (70%) – only a small minority of the
fast growing and lower-priced BKK funds offer these benefits (14% offers can-
cer therapy, 26% homeopathic medicine, and 33% chiro therapy). By contrast,
BKKs more often than AOKs offer benefits that are attractive to favourable risk
groups, such as health checkups (25% vs. 9%) and cancer screening (25% vs.
0%). Given the weak and only recently established link between BI and VSI
providers, risk-selection via VSI does not seem to be an issue yet. However,
many of VSI contracts offer rebates that may be lost if enrollees switch BI car-
rier. Andersen and Grabka (2006) conclude that attractive SI packages had an
impact on switching. However, the risk profiles of switchers are unknown.
MSI and VSI may become a more important tool for risk-selection in the near
future, if the basic benefit package is further reduced. However, in contrast
to the trend of a gradual expansion of the role of SI in health care financing,
the 2006 German health care reform plan includes a transfer of a number
MSI benefits (palliative care and some spa treatments) and some VSI benefits
(acupuncture) to the basic health insurance package.
Israel
Main features of SI
In Israel, SI can be bought voluntarily and on an individual basis from the
same insurer providing BI, a commercial insurer, or both. During the period
1995–2002, the share in the population buying SI from a BI provider rapidly
increased from 35% to 66%, while the share buying SI from a commercial
insurer increased from 16% to 24% (the share buying both types of SI grew
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from 5% to 20%). Since only SI provided by BI carriers can be used as a tool for
risk-selection in BI, we focus our analysis on this type of SI. Currently, SI covers
costs of some surgical interventions in Israel and abroad, dental care, preventive
screening, alternative medicine, co-payments in BI (especially for drugs), and
IVF. In the period 1999–2002, SI expenditures as a share of BI expenditures
grew from 3.3% to 5.3% (Table 1). In Israel, the four largest BI/SI providers
together hold 91% of the SI market share. There is an open enrolment req-
uirement and insurers may charge age-related premiums for SI coverage after
government approval. Law does not determine the composition of benefits
package and the contractual conditions. Nevertheless, the extent of product
differentiation is still moderate (Brammli-Greenberg and Gross, 2003).
Incentives for risk-selection
The quality of the risk-equalization scheme in Israel is quite poor (only age-
related subsidies), therefore BI providers can easily identify risk groups that are
highly unprofitable, such as chronically ill people (Shmueli et al., 2003). Since
BI suppliers are fully at risk and are not allowed to charge a premium for BI in
addition to the risk-adjusted capitation payments they receive from the govern-
ment, the incentives for risk-selection are strong. These incentives are mitigated,
however, by the weakly competitive structure of the BI market. Traditionally
the BI market is dominated by a few non-profit insurers, while legal entry barriers
effectively prohibit any potential competition. Switching rates are low (about 1%
per year) (Laske-Aldershof et al., 2004).
Usefulness of SI as a selection device
BI providers are allowed to offer SI only to their own enrollees. Alternatively,
BI insured may choose to buy SI coverage from commercial insurers, but they
cannot obtain SI from another BI provider. BI providers exercise the double func-
tion of SI and BI suppliers in a regulated context. The law requires that BI/SI pro-
viders keep a separate financial administration for SI and BI. Cross-subsidization
between BI and SI is forbidden and providers are not allowed to sell other types
of insurance. Despite the strong link between BI and SI, the usefulness of SI as a
selection device is restricted by open enrolment and by the limited freedom for
insurers to differentiate premiums. The limited role of SI in health care financing
and the low switching rates also reduce the usefulness of SI as a selection device.
Evidence of risk-selection via SI
Currently, there is no evidence of insurers using SI for risk-selection in BI.
Although the share of SI expenditures on BI expenditures is still small (5%), it
steadily increased during the last decade. If this trend continues, SI is likely to
become a more useful tool for risk-selection, particularly if the risk-equalization
scheme is not improved.
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The Netherlands
Main features of SI
In the Netherlands, SI is exclusively voluntary. More than 90% of BI insured buy
SI. SI can be bought on an individual basis or via group contracts. Currently, SI
covers almost all dental care for adults, alternative medicine, maternal home
care, physical therapy, psychotherapy, anticonceptives, and IVF. In the last dec-
ade, the number of services excluded from the basic benefits package and covered
by SI has steadily increased. The same applies to SI expenditures as a share of
BI spending, which grew from 2% in 1994 to 6.5% in 2003 (Table 1). The Dutch
SI market is not regulated by the government. There is no open enrolment req-
uirement and there are no restrictions on premium rate setting and the benefits
package. Although risk-rating is allowed, insurers still charge predominantly
community-rated premiums (Schut et al., 2004). The most likely explanation
for this is that SI is traditionally offered as a by-product of BI. Since almost all
insured buy SI and BI from the same insurer and switching rates were low until
2006, there was hardly any competitive pressure to differentiate SI premiums
(Laske-Aldershof et al., 2004; Douven and Schut, 2006).
Incentives for risk-selection
The risk-equalization scheme in the Netherlands is the most sophisticated
among the five countries. Nevertheless, BI providers can still easily identify
risk groups that are highly unprofitable relative to the community-rated pre-
mium that BI providers have to charge (Prinsze et al., 2005). Since BI carriers
are accountable for about 50% of gains and losses, insurers can substantially
benefit from risk-selection. Prior to 2006, incentives for risk-selection were
mitigated by the weak competition among non-profit BI providers due to the
limited propensity of consumers to switch to another insurer (Laske-Aldershof
et al., 2004; Douven and Schut, 2006). Since 1 January 2006, the Dutch health
insurance system has been profoundly reformed by the introduction of a new
MBI scheme. The former distinction between social health insurance (MBI)
for low/middle income groups and private health insurance (VBI) for high-
income groups has been abolished. Under the new BI scheme, all enrollees can
switch plans at annual open enrolment periods (two months). BI premiums
have to be community-rated and a risk-equalization scheme applies as before.
Dutch citizens had to choose a new contract for BI and SI. Anticipating that
many customers would consider switching, insurers engaged in a price war
(Douven and Schut, 2006). Indeed, the switching rate increased dramatically,
from about 3% to 18% (NZa i.o., 2006). Although switching rates in 2006
are likely to be high because of the radical change in choice setting, price com-
petition is expected to remain strong in the future. Strong price competition
substantially increases the incentives for risk-selection in the new BI scheme.
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Usefulness of SI as a selection device
In the Netherlands, there is no regulation that requires insurers to link SI with BI
coverage. On the contrary, both types of insurance have to be offered by different
juridical entities. Cross-subsidization between BI and SI providers is forbidden
and the providers must be financially independent. Despite the separation of pro-
viders, SI and BI have always been sold as a joint product under the same brand
name (Schut et al., 2004). SI and BI providers typically belong to the same hold-
ing company, making marketing and administrative costs difficult to ascribe to
the different entities. Prior to 2006, most SI contracts had a clause that the con-
tract would be automatically terminated once the insured would switch to
another BI provider. Although termination clauses are forbidden under the new
BI scheme, this prohibition does not effectively preclude tie-in sales. For instance,
several insurers made it clear that they would charge higher SI premiums to enrol-
lees choosing other BI providers and some insurers offer SI only to applicants
that obtain BI from the same company. In practice, almost all consumers still
buy SI and BI from the same company (NZa i.o., 2006).
Since SI providers are free to set premiums, determine the benefits package,
and apply medical underwriting, SI can be effectively used for risk-selection in
BI. If consumer mobility remains high after 2006, this would make SI a particu-
larly powerful tool to discriminate between different risk groups.
Other straightforward strategies would be to use health questionnaires to
identify favourable and unfavourable risk groups that apply for SI. Such strate-
gies, however, are effective only if a substantial proportion of the insured is
willing to switch (Schut and Hassink, 2002).
Given the links between BI and SI and the absence of legal restrictions on
underwriting, product differentiation, and premium setting, SI is a moderately
useful tool for risk-selection.
Evidence of risk-selection via SI
Before 2006, both the incentives for risk-selection and the usefulness of SI as a
selection device were limited. Survey results indicate that less than 1% of the
applicants were refused, despite the fact that insurers used health questionnaires
for SI applicants (Bruijn et al., 2005; Laske-Aldershof and Schut, 2005). Since
2006, price competition and consumer mobility increased, which made SI a
powerful selection device. However, to accommodate the transfer to the new BI
scheme, all insurers promised to accept all applicants for SI without medical
underwriting. Recent investigations show that in 2006 only a few insurers used
health questionnaires for SI applicants and, except for extensive dental coverage,
no applicants were refused (Bruijn and Schut, 2006; NZa i.o., 2006). Since the
promise to accept all SI applicants only holds for 2006, the probability that SI
will be used as selection device is likely to increase in the future. A possible coun-
teracting factor may be the damaging effect of such behaviour on an insurer’s
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reputation. For several years already, the National Patient Federation (NPCF),
the Ministry of Health, and the Dutch Health Authority (NZa) have mon-
itored the underwriting practices of SI providers and they publish the results
of their investigations (Laske-Aldershof and Schut, 2005; Bruijn et al., 2005;
NZa i.o., 2006).
Switzerland
Main features of SI
In Switzerland, SI is exclusively voluntary and covers dental care, sick-leave
payments, alternative medicine, upgraded hospital accommodation, access to
all physicians and hospitals all over the country, cross-border care, and trans-
portation costs for accidents in the mountains. Prior to the health care reform
of 1996, SI accounted for almost 30% of BI expenditures. Due to the introduc-
tion of a comprehensive BI scheme, however, the share of SI on BI expenditures
decreased to about 20% (Table 1). Nevertheless, the popularity of SI has
grown, with the share of BI insured holding SI coverage increasing from 62%
in 1997 to 71% in 2003. Government intervention in the SI market is limited.
There are no open enrolment requirements, standardized benefits, and premium
rate restrictions. Three types of SI carriers can be distinguished: independent SI
providers, daughter companies of BI carriers, and integrated BI/SI providers.
Consumers are free to choose among these three SI carriers. The regulatory
regimes that apply to daughter companies and integrated providers are quite
different. Integrated insurers are restricted to the exclusive provision of health
coverage by law, while daughter companies may offer all kinds of insurance
coverage besides health insurance. Combined with the more liberal supervisory
regime, this explains the growing popularity of daughter companies at the
expense of integrated ones.
Incentives for risk-selection
The risk-equalization scheme in Switzerland is based only on age, gender, and
region, implying that BI providers can easily identify risk groups that are highly
(un)profitable. Moreover, BI carriers are fully at risk and there is no reinsurance
or state aid in case of losses. Therefore, insurers have to charge sufficiently high
premiums to survive. Since insurers face substantial competition, the incentives
for risk-selection are strong.
Usefulness of SI as a selection device
Formally, basic and supplementary benefits are strictly separated. It is legally
forbidden to link rebates in SI to BI, i.e. SI carriers are not allowed to cover the
medical expenses that fall under voluntary deductibles in BI. In terms of account-
ing requirements, SI providers are obliged to keep their financial administration
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separated from BI providers. Cross-subsidization between BI and SI providers and
tie-in sale provisions in SI contracts are also forbidden.
Despite the legal separation between BI and SI carriers, most SI carriers are
daughter companies of or integrated with BI carriers, which makes it difficult
to establish whether marketing and administration costs refer to BI or SI car-
riers. Moreover, despite the fact that tying-in is forbidden, when people switch
BI provider they usually terminate their contract with the related SI carrier. This
likely reflects a consumer preference for a joint purchase of BI and SI. Since BI
and SI benefits overlap to some extent, consumers may not want to figure out
which plan is responsible to cover the costs of care once they fall ill. Moreover,
insurers try to prevent consumers from a separate purchase of BI and SI ‘by all
kind of tricks, for instance by taking away the premium discount for families or
by surcharges on the premium for extra administrative expenses’ (Beobachter
Kompakt, 2006). Beck (2004) also found that having SI significantly reduces
the probability to switch. Hence, despite the separation between BI and SI,
most consumers purchase both products from the same company. Given the
important role of SI in health care financing and the possibility of selective
underwriting, selective advertising, and product and premium differentia-
tion, the joint purchase of SI and BI makes SI a potentially useful tool for
risk-selection in the BI market.
Evidence of risk-selection via SI
Beck (2006) shows that the impact of risk-selection on premiums increased from
1997 to 2006 by a factor of 12 and can explain a substantial part of the variation
in premiums. Although empirical research is hampered by the fact that risk-
selection is a hidden activity by insurers, there is substantial evidence suggesting
that risk-selection via SI in the BI market is becoming increasingly important
(Colombo, 2001; Beck, 2004). Each year several insurers launch new SI products
that are particularly attractive to healthy customers. In addition, SI premiums are
increasingly risk-rated and new SI products for upgraded hospital accommoda-
tion are targeted at specific age groups (e.g. SI policies were launched under the
label ‘‘Hospital 20’’ and ‘‘Hospital 30’’). These new SI products are attractive
for young people as long as they pass the mandatory health check.
Conclusions of the five-country comparison
We have developed a conceptual framework to assess the probability that
insurers use supplementary insurance as a tool for risk-selection in basic insur-
ance markets. We have identified two preconditions for using SI as a selection
device: (1) the presence of incentives for risk-selection in BI, and (2) the presence
of links between SI and BI. Next, we identified which factors determine the
strength of the incentives for risk-selection in BI and the extent to which SI can
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actually be used as a tool for risk-selection. The usefulness of SI crucially depends
on the links between BI and SI, on the freedom to set the terms of the SI contract
and to select applicants, and on the relative importance of SI for BI enrollees.
We applied our framework to five countries in which the preconditions are
met, and conclude that the probability that SI is or will be used for risk-selection
substantially varies across countries.
The main findings of our five-country comparison are summarized in
Tables 2, 3, and 4.
Table 2 concludes that incentives for risk-selection in BI markets are particu-
larly strong in Switzerland and Germany, moderate in Israel and the Netherlands
(since 2006), and relatively weak in Belgium.
Table 3 concludes that SI is a highly useful tool for risk-selection in
Switzerland, followed by the Netherlands, Belgium, and Israel. In contrast,
SI is not a particularly useful selection device in Germany.
Table 4 combines the findings of Tables 2 and 3 to assess the probability
that SI is or will be used for risk-selection in each of the five countries. In
Switzerland, SI is most likely to be used for risk-selection in BI. Although
Table 3. Usefulness of SI for risk-selection in BI
Germany
The
Netherlands SwitzerlandBelgium MSI VSI Israel
Type of link Strong
(formal)
Strong
(formal)
Weak Strong
(formal)
Moderate Moderate
Freedom to use SI as
tool for risk-selection
High Low High Low High High
Importance of SI Moderate Low Low Moderate Moderate High
Usefulness of SI for
risk-selection in BI
Moderate/
High
Low Very low Moderate Moderate/
High
High
Table 2. Strength of incentives for risk-selection in BI
Belgium Germany Israel The Netherlands Switzerland
Quality of the
risk-equalisation
scheme
Moderate Moderate Low High Low
Financial risk for
insurers
Low 7.5% High 97% High >90% Moderate 54% High 100%
Competition among
insurers
Weak Strong Weak Weak (until 2006)
Strong (since 2006)
Strong
Incentives for
risk-selection
Weak Strong Moderate Moderate Strong
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insurers typically try to hide risk-selection activities, there is substantial evi-
dence that SI is increasingly used for risk-selection in the Swiss BI market.
In the Netherlands, the probability that SI will be used for risk-selection in
BI has been substantially increased since the introduction of the new BI scheme
in 2006. During the first year of the reform, health insurers agreed to accept
all applicants for SI without selection. For subsequent years, this agreement
will no longer hold, however, and the intensified competition may prompt
insurers to use SI as an effective strategy for risk-selection. Despite the strong
incentives for risk-selection in Germany, SI is not a very useful tool for risk-
selection. Nevertheless, there is some evidence of BI carriers using SI benefits
as a way to attract favourable risk groups or to deter unfavourable ones. As
compared to Germany, Belgium presents the opposite case, where SI could be
effectively used for risk-selection in BI but the incentives to do so are weak.
Despite these limited incentives, SI also appears to be increasingly used in
Belgium to attract favourable risk groups. In Israel, insurers are faced with
moderate incentives for risk-selection. Although SI and BI are closely linked,
the room to use SI for risk-selection is limited by regulation. At present, there is
no evidence that SI is used in Israel for risk-selection in BI.
Policy implications
For policymakers, expanding supplementary health insurance may be an attract-
ive policy option to alleviate the mounting pressure to contain public spending.
For insurers, however, the expansion of SI may offer opportunities for risk-
selection in BI markets. Policymakers may want to avoid this spillover effect,
since risk-selection is likely to reduce both access (due to lower cross-subsidies)
and choice (due to lower switching opportunities) for specific risk groups.
Table 4 Probability and evidence of risk-selection in BI via SI
Germany
The
Netherlands SwitzerlandBelgium MSI VSI Israel
Incentives for
risk-selection
Weak Strong Strong Moderate Moderate Strong
Usefulness of SI for
risk-selection in BI
Moderate/
High
Low Very low Moderate Moderate/
High
High
Probability of
risk-selection in
BI via SI
Low Moderate Low Moderate Moderate/
High
High
Evidence of different
strategies adopted to
use SI as a tool for
risk-selection
Yes Yes No No Limited Yes
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Policymakers can pursue two main strategies to reduce the probability that SI is
or will be used for risk-selection in BI markets. The first strategy is to reduce
the incentives for risk-selection in BI. The most effective way to accomplish this
is by improving the risk-equalization scheme. Particularly in Germany, Israel,
and Switzerland, where the quality of the current risk-equalization scheme is
quite poor, the risk-equalization formula needs to be improved to neutralize the
strong incentives for selection. Alternative ways to reduce the incentives for
risk-selection are to limit insurers’ financial risk (as in Belgium), and to restrict
competition among insurers (as in Israel). Both alternatives have the important
drawback, however, that they also reduce the incentives for efficiency.
The second strategy is to reduce the usefulness of SI as a selection device. The
most effective way to do this would be to enforce a strict separation of SI and BI
providers (as was the case in the VSI market in Germany prior to 2004). How-
ever, a strict separation would raise consumers’ search costs and inhibit an
effective coordination of services covered by BI and SI. A less radical measure
would be to forbid tie-in sales provisions in SI contracts, although the Swiss
experience shows that such a measure can be easily circumvented. The useful-
ness of SI as a selection device can also be limited by imposing regulatory res-
trictions to SI providers such as open enrolment, standardized benefits, and
premium rate restrictions (as in Israel). A disadvantage of these regulations
may be that they hamper an efficient functioning of the SI market. For ins-
tance, premium rate restrictions and standardized benefits may result in adverse
selection and could expose insurers to a premium death spiral (Cutler and
Reber, 1998). Moreover, for EU countries like Belgium, Germany, and the
Netherlands, regulating SI may not be a feasible option, since it is likely to be
in conflict with the prevailing EU regulation (Paolucci et al., 2006). An alternat-
ive strategy to counteract the use of SI as a tool for risk-selection is to make this
hidden strategy transparent. In the Netherlands, for instance, the national
patient federation (NPCF) and the Dutch Health Authority (NZa) periodically
monitor insurers’ behaviour. By investigating and exposing the use of health
questionnaires for applicants of SI, the use of tying-in strategies and the under-
writing practices, the fear of a loss of reputation may prevent insurers from
using SI for risk-selection purposes. Hence, bringing the ‘reputation mechanism’
into play might be an effective complement to the first-best strategy of improv-
ing the quality of the risk-equalization scheme. Finally, a straightforward way
to reduce the usefulness of SI as a tool for risk-selection is to limit the role of
SI in health care financing. However, this strategy is in direct conflict with the
policymakers’ aim to reduce the share of public health care expenditures.
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